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INTRODUCTION
CONFRONTING NEW MARKET REALITIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS
TO VOTE, SELL, AND SUE
MEGAN WISCHMEIER SHANER *
A defining characteristic of the corporation is its allocation of rights,
responsibilities, and power among three groups—the board of directors,
officers, and stockholders. 1 By statute, the board is tasked with managing
the business and affairs of the corporation.2 Recognizing that managing the
day-to-day operations of a corporation is not always feasible for a board of
directors, corporate law allows the board to delegate its authority and, most
often, this authority is delegated to the officers. 3 In the typical public

* Associate Professor of Law, the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business Law Corporate
Governance Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles and Responsibilities, 65 BUS.
LAW. 107, 111 (2009) (“The corporate form is defined by the way it distributes decision
rights and responsibilities among shareholders, the board and management.”); see also
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 6-7 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?,
1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 196-98 (2004) (describing the corporate governance structure
and decision-making hierarchy).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2016) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board . . . and the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction . . . of its board of directors.”); see
also Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 (Del. 1988) (stating that it
is a “basic principal of [Delaware law] that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be
managed by the board of directors”).
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142(a); Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV.A.13358,
1995 WL 54441, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995) (“Of course, given the large, complex
organizations through which modern, multi-function business corporations often operate, the
law recognizes that corporate boards, comprised as they traditionally have been of persons
dedicating less than all of their attention to that role, cannot themselves manage the
operations of the firm, but may satisfy their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers,
establishing or approving goals and plans and monitoring performance. Thus section 141(a)
of DGCL expressly permits a board of directors to delegate managerial duties to officers of
the corporation, except to the extent that the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or
bylaws may limit or prohibit such a delegation.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 673 A.2d 1207
(Del. 1996); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01(b), 8.41. The board’s ability to delegate to
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corporation, it is the officers who are given vast amounts of power and
responsibility for running the business of the corporation. 4 In contrast to the
board and officers, stockholders play a much more limited role in the
management of the corporation. Stockholders are able to participate in
corporate governance primarily through their rights to (1) vote, (2) sell, and
(3) sue. 5 These rights may be used alone or in combination to influence
corporate management and decision making, directly and indirectly.
The following excerpt provides a description of each of these
stockholder governance rights:
1. Vote. The shareholder franchise is a key part of corporate
law, but that does not mean that shareholders vote on very many
things. Most business decisions are left entirely to the board of
directors or those to whom they delegate such authority.
Shareholders participate only infrequently in a limited set of
decisions, including the election of directors, fundamental
corporate changes, and ratification.
a. Election of directors. Directors are usually elected
annually, but this pattern can be varied by the corporation's
articles of incorporation or other private ordering. Shareholders
also have the power to remove directors in some circumstances.
b. Fundamental corporate changes. Mergers and similar
transactions require the approval of shareholders as well as
directors and, thus, are an exception to the usual rule that leaves
corporate decisions entirely in the hands of the directors. Of
course, even here the directors act as gatekeepers: The
shareholders can vote only on those transactions that are
recommended to them by the directors.

others is not, however, limited to just the officers of the corporation. See Grimes, 1995 WL
54441, at *8-9.
4. See 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.10[B] (3d ed. 2014) (stating that
“normally it is the officers to whom the primary functions of management are delegated”);
Ribstein, supra note 1, at 188 (“[T]he corporate form of centralized management involves
dividing management between professional full-time executives who manage the firm dayto-day and directors who oversee the board and set policy.”).
5. See CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 157 (6th ed. 2010). Stated differently, “[a]ny action by
[stockholders] relating to the details of the corporate business is necessarily in the form of an
assent, request, or recommendation.” Cont’l Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-17 (1912).
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c. Ratification. Shareholders occasionally vote on the
ratification of self-dealing transactions by interested directors.
The vote can cleanse the transaction of any taint or shift the
burden of proof in a legal challenge.
2. Sell. The ability to sell one's shares is a core right for
shareholders and one that corporate law has, for the most part,
left to the market. Appraisal—or dissenter's rights—is a rare
exception where corporate law guarantees shareholders the right
to sell their shares. Ordinarily, under corporate norms, a
shareholder must obtain liquidity not from the corporation but
from the market, if there is one. That is not to say that corporate
law does not assume an important role for the ability to exit. Free
transferability of shares and limited liability—both core
characteristics of the corporate form—facilitate liquidity through
the market. Many corporate rules take their specific shape
because they exist in the shadow of a market for shares.
3. Sue. In addition to voting and selling, a shareholder's ability
to sue serves as a constraint on the actions of managers and is a
regular part of the governance matrix. Litigation rights of
shareholders include derivative suits, direct suits and class
actions, and inspection and other ancillary rights.
a. Derivative suits. In particular circumstances, such as
breaches of fiduciary duty by those in control of the corporation,
all states permit a shareholder to bring a suit in the name of, and
on behalf of, the corporate entity. This type of suit is an
exception to the usual rule that directors act for the corporation.
It occurs when directors are disabled by conflict or are otherwise
unable to meet their fiduciary duty. In response to the fear that a
self-appointed shareholder would bring a “strike suit” to harass
the corporation or its directors, various procedural rules
developed to balance the potential for abuse against the
monitoring value of such lawsuits.
b. Direct suits and class actions. Shareholders can also
bring direct suits, which may be class actions if numerous
shareholders are affected by common questions. In contrast to
derivative suits, in which the loss to the shareholder is derivative
of the harm to the collective enterprise, direct suits may be
brought for an injury that the shareholder feels individually, such
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as deprivation of a right to vote or a contract right. Such suits
under state corporate law have increased in recent years. They
may be based on fraud under state common law or on statutory
remedies.
c. Inspection and other ancillary rights. Shareholders also
have ancillary rights at state law, such as the right to inspect the
books and records of the corporation, including the list of
shareholders. Such inspection may be the first salvo in a
litigation battle, an effort to sell shares, or a voting campaign. 6
The traditional portrayal of stockholders in the modern American public
corporation has been one of geographically dispersed, small stakes, momand-pop holders. 7 Stockholders were largely passive individual investors,
deferring to the decisions of corporate managers and relying heavily on
market forces to serve as a check on management’s power.8 Accordingly,
the problems of collective action and rational apathy among stockholder
populations were central in corporate governance discussions.
Today, however, corporate commentators have observed a movement
away from the traditional account of stockholders, in particular at public
corporations. Professors Gilson and Gordon have observed that the
distribution of shareholdings of U.S. public corporations has migrated from
household ownership to largely institutional investors. 9 The emergence of
institutional and activist stockholders has compensated for some of the
problems identified with the traditional public corporation stockholder base
(e.g., collective action, rational apathy). However, as Gilson and Gordon
explain in their research, this shift presents its own set of unique
6. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1999, at 215, 216-18 (footnotes omitted).
7. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 6-7, 47-65; see also Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 523-24 (1990) (describing the
“passivity story” of stockholders in public corporations).
8. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675 (2007); D. Gordon Smith, The Role of Stockholders in the Modern American
Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A.
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2011).
9. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863
(2013) (“Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share
ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm.”); see also Black, supra note 7, at 570-75
(describing in 1990 the beginning of changes in institutional equity ownership and
stockholder activism).
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governance challenges. 10 In addition to the dramatic change in the
composition of a public corporation’s stockholder base, many new
realities—technological advancements, 11 regulations providing for new
ways to invest in corporations, 12 evolving transaction structures, 13 changing
litigation strategies, 14 and amendments to federal securities laws,15 to name
10. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 9, at 889-902 (discussing the problems related to
today’s “agency capitalism”). Institutional investors in particular are well-suited to solve
collective action problems:
Institutional investors, because of their large ownership percentages, can
overcome the problem of collective action in influencing corporate governance.
Further, institutional investors tend to be more knowledgeable than individual
stockholders and are less likely to be able to take advantage of selling their
stock when they become frustrated with corporate management. This means
that institutional stockholders tend to be better positioned and have more of an
incentive to carry out the traditional role envisioned for stockholders —
monitoring and enforcing board and officer conduct and engaging management
in a conversation about how the corporation should be run. There are of course
concerns that arise when you begin to talk about the role of institutional
stockholders.
Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 271, 316 n.196 (2014) (internal citations omitted); see also Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 862
(1992) (discussing institutional myopia); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1352-53 (1991)
(stating that institutional investors will remain passive); Leo E. Strine, The Delaware Way:
How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 689-90 (2005) (discussing the rise of institutional investors and stating
that “we face a world in which stockholders of operating companies are both more active
and more conflicted”).
11. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377
(2016).
12. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Business Lawyering in the Crowdfunding Era,
3 AM. U. BUS. L. Rev. 149 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the
Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335 (2012); Andrew Schwartz,
The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609 (2015).
13. See, e.g., Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Deal Protection Devices: The Negotiation,
Protection, and Enforcement of M&A Transactions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 216 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (outlining
the evolution of deal protection devices).
14. See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1551 (2015) (discussing the increase in the
appraisal action and impact on merger and acquisitions); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S.
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004) (describing the decline in the use of derivative actions and the rise
in the use of federal securities class actions and acquisition-oriented class actions); Matthew
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a few—have impacted the ability of stockholders to meaningfully
participate in corporate governance. Similar to the shift in the composition
of public corporations’ stockholder bases from individual to institutional
holders, these changes to the business and legal environment in which
stockholders and their corporations operate pose new questions and
challenges for corporate governance.
In this symposium issue, the authors use stockholders’ rights to vote,
sell, and sue as a platform for discussion of these new market realities for
public corporations. 16 Professors Randall S. Thomas and Afra Afsharipour
begin the issue by focusing on the right to vote. Professor Thomas and coauthor Patrick C. Tricker explore the exercise and effectiveness of the
stockholder franchise in two areas—the election of directors and approval
of management proposals—and provide recommendations for further areas
of investigation and research.17 Meanwhile, Professor Afsharipour
examines how stockholder approval intersects with the bidder overpayment
problem in merger and acquisition transactions.18
Next, Professors James J. Park, Joan MacLeod Heminway, and Charles
R. Korsmo focus on different aspects of a stockholder’s right to sell
his/her/its interest in the corporate enterprise. Professor Park analyzes how
federal regulation of corporate governance can serve to counter limitations
on the efficacy of stockholders’ right to sell as a means of protecting

D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 (Preliminary Figures)
(Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract_
id=2715890 (observing changes in M&A litigation rates, multi-jurisdictional litigation,
disclosure-only settlements, and enforcement of forum selection provisions); Alison Frankel,
How Corporations Can Game Their Own Forum Selection Clauses, REUTERS: ANALYSIS
& OPINION (Nov. 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/11/17/how-corpora
tions-can-game-their-own-forum-selection-clauses/ (discussing a corporation’s enforcement,
or lack thereof, of its forum selection provisions as a litigation strategy).
15. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745; DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013).
16. In addition to the authors in this symposium issue, I would also like to thank Vice
Chancellor J. Travis Laster, Dean D. Gordon Smith, and John Mark Zeberkiewicz for taking
the time to participate in, and make insightful presentations at, the symposium.
17. Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker, Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review
of the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 9 (2017).
18. Afra Afsharipour, Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A Transactions,
70 OKLA. L. REV. 127 (2017).
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themselves from poor corporate governance.19 Professor Heminway’s
article takes a closer look at the right to sell in the developing area of
crowdfunded equity securities. In particular, she offers insight into how the
transfer restrictions inherent in this type of investment affect stockholders’
financial and governance rights. 20 Professor Korsmo then discusses how the
right to sell has expanded from the classic view of selling one’s shares of
stock to include stockholders’ ability to sell the legal claims attendant to
their shares and the implications for combatting managerial opportunism. 21
Finally, Professors Jessica M. Erickson and Sean J. Griffith examine the
ability of stockholders to sue the corporation and its management. Professor
Erickson looks at the initial stages of stockholder litigation, specifically the
need for gatekeepers in stockholder litigation in order to maintain the right
to sue as a tool to control managerial costs.22 Further, she analyzes the need
to tailor the use and type of gatekeeper to the particular type of stockholder
litigation. 23 Addressing a later phase of stockholder litigation, Professor
Griffith and co-author Anthony A. Rickey focus on the settlement of
merger class actions. Pointing out how current formulations of the
settlement process in merger class actions—in particular, the recent
proliferation of disclosure settlements—undermine the right to sue in
corporate governance, Griffith and Rickey offer insight into how
stockholder objections to settlements can correct some of the shortcomings
in the settlement approval process and reinvigorate the proceeding with a
more adversarial posture. 24
While individually the contributions to this issue focus on different areas
of stockholders’ governance rights, each article also highlights broader
issues related to the changing dynamics surrounding public corporations. In
particular, the articles in this issue raise important questions such as (1)
whether a stockholder governance right functions differently today (for
better or worse) than what corporate doctrine originally envisioned, (2)
what are the emerging issues related to prominence of institutional
19. James J. Park, The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate
Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 159 (2017).
20. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, 70 OKLA.
L. REV. 189 (2017).
21. Charles R. Korsmo, Selling Stock and Selling Legal Claims: Alienability as a
Constraint on Managerial Opportunism, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 215 (2017).
22. Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers of Shareholder Litigation, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 237
(2017).
23. Id.
24. Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A
How-To Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281 (2017).
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stockholders, and (3) what areas of the law still need to adapt to new market
realities. To that end, the articles in this issue serve as a reminder of the
necessity for corporate governance structures to be continually reevaluated
and refined to account for the ever-changing legal and economic conditions
under which corporations operate.
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